Security & privacy

Log4Shell in vCenter leads to code-signing server compromise

BO Team exploited a Log4Shell vulnerability in VMware vCenter to breach a Russian developer's network, eventually compromising its CI/CD infrastructure and code-signing server.

Server racks under a glass dome with amber warning lights indicating a security alert.
Illustration created for this article

A months-long cyber espionage campaign attributed to the BO Team has resulted in the full compromise of a Russian software developer’s IT infrastructure. The attack, which began with the exploitation of a known vulnerability in VMware vCenter, escalated to seize control of the organization’s continuous integration and deployment systems as well as its code-signing server.

What happened

Kaspersky’s ICS CERT team documented the intrusion after being contacted by the affected developer in June 2025. The targeted company, which remains unnamed but serves customers within the Russian Federation, suffered a breach that spanned several months. During this period, the attackers stole confidential information and gained access to every component of the IT environment, including Windows and Linux servers, workstations, hypervisors, backup systems, and network equipment.

The threat actor, known as BO Team (also referred to as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena, and Lifting Zmiy), is assessed to be of Ukrainian origin. Active since at least 2023, the group focuses on cyber espionage and hacktivism aimed at degrading the Russian military-industrial complex. Unlike typical ransomware operations, this attack did not involve data destruction or public claims of responsibility. Instead, the actors worked to entrench themselves deeply within the network, establishing persistent command channels and backdoors to ensure they could restore access if discovered.

Key details

  • The initial entry point was an exposed SSH service on a Linux terminal server, followed by lateral movement to a VMware vCenter server running version 7.0.3.
  • Attackers exploited CVE-2021-44228, also known as Log4Shell, to gain root privileges on the vCenter server.
  • A backdoor named "pgcache" was planted in the /etc/cron.hourly/ directory to maintain persistence on the hypervisor.
  • The compromise extended to the GitLab platform and Ansible orchestration system, allowing theft of source code and private keys.
  • Attackers used legitimate system utilities like comsvcs.dll and regedit.exe to dump credentials and decrypt the Active Directory database.
  • The final stage involved compromising the software code-signing server, raising significant supply chain security concerns.

Background

The attack leveraged CVE-2021-44228, a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the Apache Log4j library. This flaw, widely known as Log4Shell, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on servers that process specific log messages. Despite being disclosed years ago, it remains a common vector for initial access because many enterprise applications, including older versions of VMware vCenter, rely on Java-based logging frameworks.

Once inside, the attackers utilized "living-off-the-land" techniques, which involve using pre-installed system tools rather than uploading custom malware. This approach helps evade detection by security solutions that look for known malicious binaries. By abusing trusted processes like scp.exe for data transfer and regedit.exe for registry access, the BO Team minimized their digital footprint while moving laterally across the network.

Why it matters

For teams that manage their own infrastructure, this incident highlights the cascading risk of unpatched vulnerabilities in core virtualization platforms. VMware vCenter acts as the control plane for many virtualized environments. Compromising it provides attackers with broad visibility and control over all hosted virtual machines. If your organization runs self-hosted CI/CD pipelines or maintains internal code repositories, a breach at the hypervisor level can lead to total loss of integrity for your software supply chain.

The compromise of the code-signing server is particularly alarming. Code signing verifies that software originates from a trusted publisher and has not been tampered with. If attackers gain access to these private keys, they can sign malicious updates or backdoored applications that appear legitimate to end-users and automated update systems. This transforms a standard network breach into a potential supply chain attack, affecting not just the victim but anyone who trusts their software.

Furthermore, the use of scheduled tasks for persistence demonstrates why monitoring background jobs is critical. The attackers disguised their backdoor as a PostgreSQL cache script in the hourly cron directory. Without visibility into what scheduled jobs are actually running and whether they are behaving as expected, such modifications can remain undetected for months, allowing attackers to maintain access even if other indicators of compromise are cleaned up.

What you can do

  • Audit all instances of VMware vCenter and ensure they are patched against CVE-2021-44228 and other known vulnerabilities.
  • Monitor scheduled tasks and cron jobs for unexpected scripts or changes in execution frequency, especially those disguised as system components.
  • Implement strict access controls and multi-factor authentication for code-signing servers and CI/CD pipelines to limit lateral movement.
  • Review and rotate private keys and certificates regularly, storing them in hardware security modules or dedicated secret management systems.
  • Enable detailed logging for hypervisors and domain controllers, and forward these logs to a secure, immutable storage location.
  • Conduct regular searches for living-off-the-land binaries and scripts that may indicate unauthorized administrative activity.

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